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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On first reading of the briefs in this case, it must appear
to the reader that the facts are in such violent dispute that the
reviewing court can scarcely resolve them.
Such a conclusion would hurt appellants who seek specific
relief, and must show that the facts clearly justify that relief
in order to obtain it.

Similarly, confusion as to the facts serves

respondent.
Appellants contend that if the verbiage is cut through, so
that the inquiry goes to the factual documentation for statements,
rather than to the statements themselves, that there is really no
substantial factual disagreement in these briefs.
As an example, appellants seek to have the amount, $246,033.08,
of appellants1 judgment

affirmed.

To counter this, respondents1 brief attacks the amount by
using emotionally charged words responding to the amount of her
judgment such as "sham" (Resp. Brief pp. 8, 198, 19, 25, 29, 31),
"windfall," (Resp. Brief pp. 5, 33), "collusion," (Resp. Brief
pp. 32, 33, 35), "set-up," (Resp. Brief pp. 6, 23, 30, 35), "contrived," (Resp. Brief pp. 12, 18, 20, 22, 25, 29, 31, 33), "excessive," (Resp. Brief pp. 19, 31, 33, 35),and "machination," (Resp.
Brief pp. 33).
What documentation does respondent submit to support these
adjectives?

On Mrs. Christiansen's part, she carefully documented
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medical, earning and pain basis for her damages (App.
14).

Brief 12-

The basic support was the affidavit of her attending physi-

cian, Dr. Robert Baer (R., 181-186) which detailed her injuries,
their effect on her ability to work, and her future medical expense for their treatment.
Respondent submitted no rebutting medical affidavit at all.
Clearly, in a personal injury case, the foundation for the
amount of damages is the amount of physical injury.
Respondent had the opportunity to submit such documentation.
It had deposed Dr. Baer, Dr. Burgoyne, head of the chronic pain
clinic

attended by Mrs. Christiansen, had had her independently

examined by a doctor of respondent's choosing and had her complete
medical records.
At pages 7 and 8 of respondent's Brief, numbered paragraphs
3 and 4, respondent says two doctors take a minimal view of her
injuries.
Repondent's counsel are obviously highly skilled.

The law

requiring impeaching material to be in form admissible in evidence
is rudimentary.

Notwithstcinding, there is not a single word from

either of those doctors or from any medical source in affidavit,
excerpt from deposition, or transcript/before this court or the
trial court to support respondent's position in an admissible form.
One would expect that when a party uses the adjectives used
by respondent, that party would document them.

To repeatedly say

that the amount of Mrs. Christiansen's judgment is a sham, con-

trived, collusive, etc., is to tar her.

That might be justified

if the facts are clear, but then to fail to support with supporting facts is a very questionable procedure.
From this, it can be inferred that the reason respondent has
totally failed to document can only be that the documentation does
not exist.
In other words, there is no factual dispute

properly before

the court as to the extent of Mrs. Christiansen's injuries.
has documented their severity.

She

Respondent has totally failed,

factually, documentarily, precisely, candidly, to rebut them.
Verbiage, yes. Facts, no.
This brings into focus the necessity and purpose of Rule
75(p)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It provides.

"If the respondent agrees with the statement of facts
set forth in appellant's brief, he shall so indicate.
If he controverts it, he shall state wherein such
statement is inconsistent with the facts and shall
make a statement of the facts as he finds them, giving reference to the pages of the record supporting
his statement and controverting appellant's statement."
It should be noted that respondent's brief, in its statement
of facts, which is partially contained in the formally designated
statement of facts and also in its argument Point I, does not cotply
with this rule.

It has no designation of the factual statements

submitted by appellants with which respondent disagrees, nor
cites to the transcript, so that this court can review points of
difference, and make an independent determination as to who is
accurate.
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Appellants see the law as being essentially at rest, each
side having submitted law appropriately supporting its factual
position, with the caveat that appellants argue that even if
the case be viewed as one of indemnity, the full amount of Mrs.
Christiansen's judgment is still, under these facts, the proper
measure of damages, not the $15,000 paid by Holiday.
Reading these briefs requires the conscious application of
the phrase "ipse dixit" on an appellate level—is a thing so
because a person says that it is, or is it so because it is documented?
The purpose of this reply brief is to clarify the facts.
Appellants' approach will be to list the key points of fact,
as stated by both sides, and compare these to (1) the position of
the other party on that point and (2) the transcript.
The factual contentions raised in respondent's brief will
be considered first.
IS THE AMOUNT OF APPELLANT PATRICIA CHRISTIANSEN'S JUDGMENT,
$246,033.08, JUSTIFIED?
Respondent states in its brief that Mrs. Christiansen's
$246,033.08 judgment "bears no relation of any kind to appellant's
injuries." (p. 8)
To support this contention, respondent rests solely on the
affidavit of its attorney, Mr. Stevens (p. 8 and 33; R. 476-484).
Other than the undocumented attack on the severity of Mrs. Christiansen's injuries and their effect on her life and earning capacity, the point made in Mr. Steven's affidavit, and as argued
-4-

in respondent's brief at pages 7 and 33, is that a month prior to
the trial before Judge Dee of the issue of Airport's contractual
obligation to extend insurance to Holiday, and of Mrs. Christiansen's settlement with the Maws, Lingards and Holiday, she had
offered settlement of her case for $85,000.

This, he argues,

states the upper limit of her own evaluation of her claim.
The reasons for Mrs. Christiansen, injured, disabled and
unemployed, making an offer of settlement below the value of her
case are not in this record, because Mr. Stevens filed his affidavit during the course of the last argument before Judge Daniels
when the record was complete otherwise.
ter of common sense.

They are, though, a mat-

The amount a jury might award to a single,

divorced woman in Utah is very unpredictable and what apportionment of fault might a jury make (while Holiday was clearly negligent, there was a question of her comparative negligence)?

Holi-

day didn't have the money to pay a substantial judgment (Nielsen
affidavit R. 365-368), so her only chance of full recovery was
from Home as insurer of Airport, which would involve additional
time and uncertainty to litigate the extension of the policy of
insurance to Holiday so as to cover her claim.
In that situation, a plaintiff will settle for less than
a case is worth in order to provide for themselves and their
family and to have the money in hand.

Simply, the realistic

application of the old axiom that "A bird in the hand is worth
two in the bush."
-5-

The fact that even under those circumstances, plaintiff
insisted on at least $85,000, a very substantial sum, would mean
that she and her counsel's evaluation of her injuries was in a
far higher figure.

This was a discount for cash on the spot.

It is possible that Home missed the boat and should have
accepted her offer.
Finally, Judge Fishier is not a rubber stamp.
have approved a judgment for $10,000,000.

He would not

The judgment in his

eyes even though he accepted appellants1 requests, had to be based
on sound mathematics and the facts of the matter presented to him.
While a default judgment does not have the same sanctity as one
subject to cross-examination, it still has weight and should not
be ignored.
The minimizing affidavit of the attorney for the insurance
company

without any kind of documentary support, scarcely stands

as a factual rebuttal of the validity of the amount of the judgment Mrs. Christiansen obtained from Judge Fisher.
Also, for respondent to attack the amount of appellants'
judgment requires some showing of collusion or fraud based on
proper

factual documentation.

Respondent has submitted none.

Mr. Stevens1 affidavit merely confirms that due to the refusal
of Home to defendant Holiday, it was forced to settle with plaintiff.
The result is this:

Mrs. Christiansen's judgment has support

in the record and respondent's opposition to it does not.

DID AIRPORT BREACH ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO EXTEND ITS
LIABILITY INSURANCE TO HOLIDAY, I.E., IS THE HOME INSURANCE
POLICY IN FORCE COVERING APPELLANTS' CLAIM?
The entire foundation of Airport's case is that it breached
its obligation to extend its liability insurance to Holiday.
The reason is that, with the obligation breached, there is
no insurance extending to Holiday to cover Mrs. Christiansen's
judgment.

That, in turn, leads to liability based on breach of

contract to provide insurance, $15,000 (see Resp. Brief pp.
12-15), rather than an obligation to insure, $246,000 (see App.
Brief pp. 32-39).

Home prefers a $15,000 obligation.

If, as a matter of fact, Airport honored that commitment,
the case is over - there is insurance in force covering appellants so that all respondent's arguments of indemnity and breach
of contract are moot.
What does respondent say in its brief on the facts relative
to this point?
The only specific statement is at page 12 of respondent's
brief:
"Under the facts of the case as determined at trial,
Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with Holiday
under which it was obligated to procure liability
insurance. For the purposes of its motion for summary judgments, Airport Shuttle conceded that it had
breached this obligation and procured no such insurance, and that had it purchased such insurance, that
insurance would have extended coverage to plaintiff's
claimed damages." [Emphasis added.]
As support for this vital "concession," that Airport
breached the contract, the only facts submitted are stated
at page 11 of respondent's brief that (1) the owners of Air-

port Shuttle, Mr. Howell and Mr. Hinckley, did not believe
they were obligated to provide the insurance and (2) that
Airport Shuttle's attorney made no representation to the
court that he believed the Home Insurance policy covered
Holiday.
As to the first point, that Airport did not believe it
was obligated to provide the insurance, that is now ancient
history, unappealed res judicata, the jury before Judge Dee
having specifically found that Airport did have that obligation to extend insurance. (R. 248, App* brief p. 11)
As Airport says, "Under the facts of this case as determined at trial, Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with
Holiday under which it was obligated

to procure liability

insurance." (Resp. Brief p. 12)
Airport contended for a point - its owners believed they
had no contractual obligation to extend insurance to Holiday,
lost before Judge Dee on that very point (App. brief p. 17),
in 1982, and never appealed.

To now raise the point as a

genuine basis for a present legitimate factual dispute is
simply an attempt to mislead the court by misstating adjudicated facts.

(App. Brief p. 17)

The second contention, that Airport Shuttle's attorney
never made any representation to any court that he believed
the Home Insurance covered Holiday (Resp. Brief p. 11), is
also unsupported by facts in respondent's brief. It is simply

a bare assertion•
Airport in its brief had the opportunity to explain or
put in a different context its attorney's chamber statements
to Judge Dee, such as "my clients (Airport) have insurance
that will cover this agreement (the "insured contract" with
Holiday)•" (App. brief p. 20, context at pp. 6-11)
The quotes are there in black and whitedenies them.

Airport simply

This fails to raise an issue of fact before this

court based on evidence.
The result is that Airport has acknowledged the facts
asserted by appellants (App. brief pp. 6-11, 20, law at 27-29)
relating to judicial estoppel of Airport.
In respondent's statement as to why the contract to extend
insurance was breached, the key phrase is "had it (Airport)
purchased such insurance, that insurance would have extended
coverage to plaintiffs' claimed damages." (Resp. brief p. 12).
What does Airport mean?
the fact is on it.
insurance?

The burden of proof to establish

How does it prove it didn't purchase the

If it did, as it concedes, the insurance is in force.

As pointed out in appellants' brief, all the steps necessary to prove the insurance was in full force and effect at the
time of plaintiff's injury were documented.

(App. brief pp.

5-11, 17-18, 30-31)
Appellants challenged respondent with the obligation of
coming up with facts, such as nonpayment of premium, the agent
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overstepping his authority, failure to properly interpret the
policy of insurance, or such to show that some breach had
occurred which would keep the insurance from being in force.
(App. brief pp. 19-20)
RESPONDENT TOTALLY AND ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET THAT
CHALLENGE.

It dropped the burden of proof.

The closest it

came is the statement, at page 12 of its brief, "that had it
purchased such insurance, that insurance would have extended
coverage to plaintiff's claimed damages," i.e.f we didn't pay
the premium, i.e. Home is not obligated to insure us against
plaintiff's or Holiday's claims.
Had there been any facts at all favoring Airport that
it had breached by nonpayment of premium, most assuredly respondent would have submitted them to Judge Daniels, and would
have submitted them to this court for this appeal.
Airport and Home know perfectly well that the insurance
was in force, as the initial payment of an additional premium
was not necessary.

(App. Brief pp. 6, 8, 10, 20, 31)

If not, and this is repetitive but the point has to be
made, Airport and Home would have submitted chapter and text
from the insurance policy, the agent or the ledgers, on the
necessity and amount of the increased premium to cover Holiday;
when it was due; and that it was not paid.
None of these contentions are established to the slightest
degree by Airport.

It doesn't even try.

the premium wasn't paid.

It just falsely says

Airport's reasons for doing this are

explained in appellants1 brief at pages 15 to 25.
The assertion of the fact of nonpayment without support
leaves the fact unproved, and sustains plaintiff's facts.
The result is that appellants1 evidence tending to prove
that all facts necessary to prove the insurance was in force
are admitted by respondent's failure to rebut.
IS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM COVERED BY THE HOME INSURANCE POLICY?
Respondent claims that there is no such coverage.
While this case was on appeal, Airport, through its attorney, Mr. Stevens, tendered Mrs. Christiansen its check for
$15,000.

This was not an offer of settlement.

As his letter

indicates, this was a payment in full of the $15,000 judgment
entered by Judge Daniels against Airport based on the amount
paid by Holiday.
A photostat

(Letter Annex #1)
of that check is also annexed. (Annex #2)

The Payor of that check is Home Insurance Company.
What is the significance of this check?
Let us examine this from the position of Home.
If, as Airport claims, it breached its obligation to have
the Home insurance in force, then Airport is liable to indemnify Holiday.

Home is not because the policy is simply not in

force relative to plaintiff's claim.

That means there is no

duty on Home to pay any claim or settlement to plaintiff or
Holiday, whether based on liability or indemnity.
The

fact that Home pays plaintiff to protect Airport

means that its posture before this court can be reconsidered.
While Home says it is on the sidelines, the fight being
between Airport and Holiday for failure to make the insurance
effective, its act of paying indicates that Home operates on
two levels.

On the upper level, for the purpose of litigation

(Resp. p. 1 2 ) , Home says it is not involved, not the insurer
here.

On the lower level, it concedes it is the insurer by

making payment to protect Airport.
pay, Home will pay.

That is, if Airport has to

It did.

This can only be on the basis that Home's position is
only that, a position, and it knows in fact after it has plead
Airport into being
there.

uninsured, that it cannot abandon Airport

Should it do so, Home's attorney, hired, paid and

directed by Home, would be in an untenable position of conflict of interest as to whose interests he really serves,
Home's or Airport's.
Now let us examine this from Airport's position.
It was totally in Airport's interest when there was a
jury finding that it had the obligation to extend its insurance to Holiday, and its agent, Mr. Denning, said that it had
done so, and that the insurance was in force covering Holiday
for plaintiff's claim, not to make any statement such as,
"Airport Shuttle conceded that it had breached its obligation
and procured no such insurance ... ."

(Resp. brief p. 12)

To the contrary, Airport would have told Home to protect
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and indemnify Airport.
If Home refused to do so, Airport would have joined Holiday in settling with plaintiff and would have assigned its
policy rights against Home to her as Holiday did.
In review, these factors lead to what, appellants contend,
are inescapable conclusions.

These are:

1. Appellants have factually established that the Home
insurance covers plaintiff's claims.

Respondent, Airport, has

submitted no facts to rebut this before Judge Daniels nor here.
2. Airport would not have "conceded" that it had breached
its obligation to extend the insurance to Holiday if Airport
was speaking for itself.

That would leave Airport exposed to

liability, whether for $15,000 or $246,000.

Accordingly, the

concession was based on the knowledge of the Home - Airport
attorney, that Airport faced no actual exposure.

(See App.

brief, pp. 15-25) Home uses Airport as a straw man.
That is, not only within the civil burden of proof, but
literally beyond a shadow of a doubt, Home knows its insurance
is in force and is using the courts to delay the enforcement
of plaintiff's claim until once against she weakens to the
point where she offers to settle for $85,000, not because of
the merits of her claim, but because faced with endless litigation and chances of losing, she once again discounts her
claim.
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HAS, AND IS, HOME MANIPULATING THE COURTS?
Appellants refer here to their brief pages 15 to 25 and
39 to 41.
Appellants there pointed out the steps taken by Home,
adverse to Holiday, its indirect insured, and adverse to Airport, its direct insured, which appellants claim did in fact
amount to a manipulation of the judicial system.
Respondent's brief can be read and reread.

Aside from

rhetoric, there is not a single fact stated in that brief which
in any way rebuts the argument that it manipulated.

This is

before this court on appeal, and respondent had the duty to
rebut, or stand at risk by its silence.
Rather, Home, by its present brief, proves what appellants contended.

That is, Home is the real party in interest

in defense of this case, not Airport.

CONCLUSION
Mrs. Christiansen's judgment should be affirmed in amount
as to Holiday and Airport.

The court is requested to find that

Airport's obligation to extend its liability insurance from
Home to Holiday was not breached, but was honored.

The court

is requested to find that the Home insurance covers Airport
and Holiday for plaintiff's claim.

The court is requested to

find that Home is a real party in interest.
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The court is requested to award appellants' attorney
fees and costs for this appeal.
DATED June 18, 198 4.
Respectfully submitted,

^SAMUEL K^kG
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January 19, 1984

Samuel King
Attorney at Law
301 Gump & Ayers Building
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Re:

Holiday Rent-A-Car v. Airport Shuttle
Our File No. 25721-10

Dear Sam:
I have now received a
$15,000 judgment in favor of
Naturally, I understand this
your client. We, therefore,
judgment.

draft for the payment of the
Holiday Rent-A-Car in this matter.
judgment has been assigned to
hereby tender payment of that

Please find enclosed a satisfaction of judgment in the
case. In view of the assignment posture, I have prepared the
satisfaction of judgment for signature both by you and by
Dale Lambert on behalf of Holiday Rent-A-Car.
After you have had a chance to execute the satisfaction
of judgment, I would be happy to exchange the payment draft
with you. I will take care of getting Mr. Lambert's signature
on the satisfaction.
Sincerely yours,
S, BRANDT,/MILLER & NELSON

L. STEVENS
RLS/jps
Enc:

Satisfaction of Judgment
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